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Stephens Media v. Dist. Court, 
125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 63 (Dec. 24, 2009)1
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—PRESS’S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO 
JUROR QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
Summary 
 Review of a motion regarding two issues of first impression: (1) determining whether 
petitioners met the proper procedure whereby the press may file a motion to intervene in a 
criminal case when seeking access to juror questionnaires, and (2) whether district courts must 
publicly disclose juror questionnaires. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 The Court answered the first question by holding that the petitioners’ petition for 
extraordinary writ relief in the form of either a writ of prohibition or a writ of mandamus was 
proper only under the guise of a writ of mandamus so long as the legal issues were not moot.  
The Court further held the legal issues in this case were not moot and therefore procedurally 
proper when considered for review.  The Court answered the second question in the positive by 
concluding that the press presumptively has a First Amendment right of access to all criminal 
proceedings (juror questionnaires included). 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 The September 8, 2008 scheduled criminal trial of Orenthal James Simpson and Charles 
Stewart for various criminal offenses attracted a great deal of press coverage due to the notoriety 
stemming from Simpson’s past criminal and civil trials for the murders of his ex-wife, Nicole 
Simpson, and her lover, Ron Goldman.  On September 3, 2008 the district court issued a 
Decorum Order whereby the court forbade the media from publishing the name, address, or 
description of any prospective juror.  Additionally, the court’s Decorum Order provided for a 
sample copy of the juror questionnaire only after a jury was seated for the case. 
 Stephens Media LLC dba Las Vegas Review Journal and The Associated Press 
(collectively “the press”) filed an emergency application to intervene in regards to the Decorum 
Order’s position on juror questionnaires.  Specifically, the press sought access to a blank jury 
questionnaire before oral voir dire, along with copies of questionnaires filled-out by those jurors 
ultimately chosen to hear the case.  The district court held a hearing in regard to the application 
and summarily denied the press’s application to intervene, proposing that Nevada law forbids 
intervention in criminal cases.  Additionally, the district court dismissed the First Amendment 
right to access juror questionnaires argument by stating that the potential for a tainted jury was 
too great to warrant the press’s access.  Specifically, the dictrict court feared that potential jurors 
would view the blank juror questionnaire before voir dire and contrive answers to those 
questions in order to position themselves on the jury.  Furthermore, the district court disallowed 
the press’s access to completed juror questionnaires because the district court promised jurors 
that the juror questionnaires were under seal and therefore confidential.  Subsequent to the 
dismissal, the press challenged the district court’s decision by filing an emergency petition for 
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writ of prohibition or mandamus.  After the jury rendered its verdict, the district court released 
redacted copies of the selected jury’s completed questionnaires. 
 
Discussion 
 Initially, the Court defined writs of prohibition2 and writs of mandamus3 in order to better 
classify the press’s challenge.  Additionally, the Court described the potential for it issuing an 
extraordinary writ “where there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy [at law].”4
 
   
Procedural Determination  
The Court described the press’s challenge as a request for an extraordinary writ of 
mandamus, concluding that the only way to challenge a district court’s refusal to allow an 
application for interference was through an extraordinary writ because the district court’s 
determination was not an appealable order.   Additionally, the Court held that a writ of 
mandamus is only proper in review of cases with live controversies, and that if the legal issues 
involved in an action were rendered moot by subsequent events then the Court had no power to 
review the case.  However, the Court held it can review a non-live controversy under these 
circumstances: (1) if the issue will likely arise again, and (2) if the challenged action was too 
brief in duration to encompass full litigation before its natural expiration. 
Here, the Court found the specific controversy in this case would normally be considered 
moot because the district court had already withheld the juror questionnaires from the press.  
However, the Court still held review of this issue proper because (1) a contest where the media 
demands access to juror questionnaires will likely arise again given the media’s inquisitive 
nature into high-profile cases; and (2) the full constitutional implications of juror-questionnaire-
closure is unlikely to be fully litigated before the expiration of voir dire proceedings. 
Additionally, the Court noted that writs of mandamus are usually reviewed under a 
manifest abuse of discretion standard; however, here, the court held that when the issue in an 
action is drawing the line between unconditionally-protected speech and legitimately-regulated 
speech, the standard of review is de novo.   
 
Presumption of Full-Disclosure for Voir Dire Materials 
 The Court found that the First Amendment implicitly guarantees the public access to 
criminal proceedings.  As a proxy of the public, the press too is allowed access to criminal 
proceedings.  This right is historically recognized because criminal trials were open to the public 
and open-jury selection is a part of American jurisprudence—concepts the colonists transported 
from sixteenth-century England.  Furthermore, the Court held that the First Amendment’s right 
of access encompasses juror questionnaires because these questionnaires are merely used to 
facilitate and expedite the voir dire process and are not a separate and distinct proceeding. 
 The Court held that jury questionnaires are presumptively subject to disclosure—this 
presumption can only be overcome if the district court can articulate specific findings as to why 
closure is necessary and narrowly tailored to protect countervailing interests to public access.  
                                                 
2 A writ of prohibition prevents a district court that is already performing judicial functions outside of its jurisdiction 
from doing so.  Sonia F. v. Dist. Ct., 125 Nev. ___, 215 P. 3d 705, 707 (2009). 
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The Court specifically adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s Press-Enterprise II balancing test,5 
which states that a district court may deny access to jury questionnaires only after it “(1) make[s] 
specific findings, on the record, demonstrating that there is a substantial probability that the 
defendant would be deprived of a fair trial by the disclosure of the questionnaires and (2) 
consider[s] whether alternatives to total suppression of the questionnaires would have protected 
the interest of the accused.”6
 A district court must therefore balance a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
a fair trial with the press’s First Amendment right of access.  The Court noted the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s position that because the Bill of Rights were not prioritized in any order of importance, it 
is not appropriate for subsequent courts to prioritize them.  This non-prioritization prevents the 
Sixth Amendment from inherently outweighing the First Amendment in a balancing test. 
  
 The first prong of the Press-Enterprise II balancing test requires a district court to make 
explicit findings to support its closure order along with a finding that there exists a substantial 
probability that a defendant will be deprived of a fair trial if the press had access to the criminal 
proceedings (in this case, questionnaires).  The Nevada Supreme Court noted that the U.S. 
Supreme Court was skeptical of prior restraint on speech based solely on the risk of unfair 
prejudice to a jury pool.  The Nevada Supreme Court adopted such skepticism, finding that every 
high-profile case risks jurors prejudging a criminal defendant—the Court held such prejudgment 
did not substantially deprive a defendant of a fair trial.  Indeed, both Courts thought the press’s 
continued presence could not prevent twelve people from faithfully carrying out their duty as 
jurors.  Here, the district court merely leveled a basic concern that jurors would not be candid if 
they had a copy of a juror questionnaire prior to voir dire.  The Court found this concern 
insufficient to outweigh the First Amendment’s presumption of openness because the district 
court made no specific findings of fact to support its order. 
 The second prong of the Press-Enterprise II balancing test requires a district court to 
consider alternatives to closure before pursuing it.  The Court held that the district court failed to 
consider any alternatives before forbidding the press’s access to the questionnaires.  However, 
for the purposes of future decisions, the Court listed a few alternatives to blanket closure of a 
blank juror questionnaire and a completed questionnaire. 
As an alternative to forbidding public disclosure of a blank questionnaire, the Court 
suggested that a district court judge remove a suspicious juror for cause if the judge truly feared 
a juror was answering questions during voir dire falsely so as to ensure his seat on the jury. 
As an alternative for forbidding public disclosure of a completed questionnaire, the Court 
suggested that district court judges should forewarn all potential jurors that their statements made 
during voir dire and in their questionnaires may be subject to public disclosure and any deeply 
sensitive question may be asked and answered in camera with counsel present and on the record.  
This in camera questioning will reduce the risk of unnecessary closure of voir dire proceedings 
as only those deeply personal questions will be removed from public access due to privacy 
concerns. 
The Court also reviewed whether the redacted versions of the juror questionnaires the 
district court gave to the press satisfied the balancing test.  The Court held that the redacted 
questionnaires did not satisfy the balancing test because the district court did not base its 
redactions on any specific finding or discernible criteria. 
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4 
 
Conclusion 
The First Amendment encompasses the right of public access to criminal proceedings—
criminal proceedings include juror questionnaires.  All criminal proceedings are presumptively 
open to the public unless a court can document why a defendant would be deprived of a fair trial 
because of such access, and the court considers less drastic alternatives to total suppression of 
any document/proceeding. No blanket statement, generalization, or conjecture is capable of 
outweighing the press’s First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings. 
. 
